



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
3 April 1963

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
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
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3. Argentina: Government issues ultimatum to naval rebels. (Page 3)



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5. Guatemala: Military government may adopt moderate policies. (Page 5)



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7. Algeria-France: Seizure of French-owned farmlands in Algeria may bring new period of strained French-Algerian relations. (Page 7)

8. Notes: USSR;  Hungary; USSR - Communist China. (Page 8)

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\*Argentina: (Information as of 0400 EST) The Guido government has given hold-out naval rebels an ultimatum to surrender or it will commence bombing two of their three main bases today.

The government's superior strength forced the rebels to retreat from both Buenos Aires and La Plata to nearby naval bases by Tuesday evening. The major Puerto Belgrano naval base, some 350 miles south of the capital, apparently is also under rebel control. Thus far, the main casualties apparently were inflicted by rebel bombings of a tank column.

Four retired officers, including 75-year-old General Benjamin Menendez, have led the rebellion, but the navy has supplied the main military forces behind the rightist revolutionary attempt initiated early on 2 April. The scattered air force rebels lacked combat power, and army troops which rebelled in Cordoba were neutralized by loyal troops there. The sea fleet, which was a big factor in the ouster of Peron in 1955, reportedly has pledged its loyalty to the government, although rebel broadcasts have claimed its support.

The objective of the rebels is to block the general elections scheduled for 23 June. Even military and civilian elements who want elections express considerable pessimism over the political parties' ability to complete preparations in time. This political confusion will prolong the crisis.

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Guatemala: The new military government may adopt moderate policies.

Its initial tasks are to rally public support for its opposition to former President Arevalo, and to reassure other governments of the hemisphere, which are delaying recognition.

The government apparently wishes to avoid becoming identified with discredited or far-rightist civilian politicians. Only one of the five civilian members of the cabinet formed on 1 April has been active in a recognized political party.

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(Arevalo's whereabouts is still not known; he may still be in the country. His supporters would probably like to organize demonstrations against the new regime but are apparently disorganized by the arrest of many of their leaders. Those still at large probably are afraid that premature action might precipitate an even stronger government crackdown.)

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DAILY BRIEF

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Algeria-France: The Ben Bella government's sudden seizure of French-owned farmlands last week threatens to bring on a new period of strained French-Algerian relations.

Previously the Algerians had indicated that the liquidation of French holdings would be a gradual, orderly process. The seizure probably stemmed from domestic pressures on Ben Bella to demonstrate his continued devotion to revolutionary ideals.

His policy of close economic cooperation with France has long been under fire. France's failure to respond to the Algerian protest against the mid-March atomic test and to its recent request for the renegotiation of last year's Evian agreement probably increased the pressure.

(In its continuing effort to broaden foreign economic support, the Algerian Government has approached the American and West German embassies seeking contributions to development projects, and has implied that it would also approach Soviet bloc representatives.)

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DAILY BRIEF

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NOTES

USSR: The lunar probe launched on 2 April will, if successful, reach the vicinity of the moon about 1200 EST on 5 April. The mission of the probe is believed to be either the soft landing of an instrumented package or the orbiting of a vehicle for reconnaissance over the edge of the shadow on the lunar surface. A soft landing could provide valuable information on the properties of the moon's surface, while a reconnaissance vehicle in lunar orbit could provide lunar terrain mapping data of considerable value to subsequent lunar exploration. [REDACTED]

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Hungary: In its preliminary assessment of the Hungarian amnesty, the US Legation in Budapest concludes that 300 to 400 prisoners have probably already been released by the regime. The amnesty, announced on 21 March, is to be completed by 4 April. After this date, the legation anticipates that Hungary as well as some Western governments will bring pressure on the US to respond "in a meaningful way," such as agreeing to drop the Hungarian issue in the UN. [REDACTED]

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DAILY BRIEF

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\*USSR - Communist China: Moscow's 30 March letter to the Chinese proposing that "high-level" bi-lateral talks be held in Moscow on 15 May appears to contain no demands or conditions that would be unacceptable to Peiping. The letter stated that all the questions raised in Peiping's letter of 9 March to the Soviet party could be discussed. The Soviet invitation to Mao Tse-tung to visit Moscow was designed to counter Mao's earlier suggestion that Khrushchev might stop in Peiping during his journey to Cambodia. Moscow pointed out that Khrushchev has no plans to visit Cambodia. It is unlikely that either Khrushchev or Mao will become directly involved in the opening phase of these talks.

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